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ABSTRACT 
 
Factors Affecting the Strategic Choices of the European Union Maritime Shipping 
Industry:  Pre- and Post- European Union Anti-Trust Exemption. (April 2009) 
  
 
Samuel Henderson 
Department of Maritime Administration 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Joan Mileski 
Department of Maritime Administration 
 
This research explores the factors that affect the strategic decision to use or not use pools 
and conferences within the European Union (EU) maritime industry.  The following 
research questions were explored:  What were the differences pre- EU and post- EU 
harmonization of pooling regulations?  Further, what part do country characteristics 
play?   
 
The importance of this research is to understand the conditions for the selection of 
strategic choices in the maritime industry.  In October 2008, the Exemption Block, 
created by regulation 4056-86, was repealed.  The landscape of the pre-exemption (pre-
1986) EU shipping industry changed after the exemption, allowing anti-competitive 
techniques to be used.  In theory, this was to help stabilize the shipping markets by 
reducing fluctuation in freight rates.  It is the hypothesis that the change in regulation 
iv 
 
will have an effect on the EU liner industry landscape with an increase in merger activity 
and reduction in freight rate volatility.   
 
This research tested the hypothesis by using financial records of major shipping 
companies, and direct data from companies using pooling techniques, and merger data 
from industry journals.  Using statistical analysis, these data were analyzed using paired 
t-tests.  It was determined that both freight rate volatility and merger activities were 
affected by the change in regulation.  This research relates directly to strategic 
management issues students will face within the shipping industry and will have a 
positive impact on our future decision making abilities relating to the maritime industry. 
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BDI Baltic Exchange Dry Index 
EC European Commission 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This research explores the factors that affect the strategic decision to use or not use pools 
and conferences within the European Union (EU) maritime industry.  EU regulation 
4056-86 granted an exemption, expanding the use of pooling by firms operating in and 
out of EU member countries as seen in Figure 1.1   
 
 
Figure 1.  Map of EU Member Countries 
_____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Maritime Policy and Management. 
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The following research questions will be explored:  What were the differences across 
two time periods: pre EU harmonization of EU general regulations that impact maritime 
pooling, and post EU harmonization?  What factors led to the changes in regulation 
allowing the use of pooling by shipping companies?   
 
Pools are a collection of similar vessels, under various ownerships, which are placed 
under the care of a centralized administration.1   This central administration is in charge 
of marketing the “pool” of vessels as a singular fleet unit.2  As earnings come in, the 
administration is also in charge of distributing these by a “weighting” system.  A 
“weighting system” is a system based on percentage of involvement within a “pool”, to 
determine what percentage of profit and expenses vessel owners receive or pay.2 
Regardless of its actions as the controller of the pool, the administration must market 
both the pool and the individual vessels themselves.1 They will also do charters, 
scheduling, and commercially operating the vessels for the respective owners. 
 
Pooling techniques are used primarily within the liner shipping area of the maritime 
shipping industry.  These conferences allow competitors to pool resources on specific 
routes in order to control rates and in theory, help the efficient and continuous movement 
of goods.1  While pools are not seen extensively within the US, they are used throughout 
the remaining maritime industry.  This paper will focus on the EU liner industry 
specifically and the EU regulations regarding their use of pools.  
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The importance of this research is to understand the conditions for the selection of 
certain strategic choices in the maritime industry.  In October 2008, the Exemption 
Block, created by regulation 4056-86, was repealed as EU Regulation 1419/2006 comes 
into effect.3  That change in EU regulation may have an impact on the strategic policies 
of companies operating within the European Union.  Understanding factors which relate 
to strategic choices will help future decision makers.   
 
Under Williamson’s transactional cost economic theory, firms’ structure will be 
substituted for market structure for transactions where the conditions of uncertainty, 
bounded rationality, opportunism and complexity exist in the organization’s 
environment.4  Within the EU Maritime liner industry there is uncertainty as to how to 
adjust to the new regulation changes.5  The landscape of the pre-exemption (pre-1986) 
EU shipping industry changed after the exemption, allowing anti-competitive techniques 
to be used.   It is my proposal that a similar landscape will develop after the repeal of the 
pooling exemption, similar to the pre-1986 landscape.  However, the repeal is limited to 
traffic to and from the EU.  Defining the parameters of use of these alliances will assist 
in understanding and predicting the future landscape of the EU shipping industry. 
 
It is my argument that this change in EU regulation giving a block exemption for firms 
utilizing conferences could have an impact on the European Union maritime industry 
firms.  The first hypothesis is the Block exemption has an effect on volatility of freight 
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rates on liner routes.  The second hypothesis is that the change in regulation by the lift of 
the block exemption will cause an increase in merger activity. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORY AND METHODS 
 
History 
Shipping conferences expanded in popularity following the successful model of the UK 
to Calcutta conference which, in 1875, found that by collectively offering rebates to 
shippers, the member lines could get shipper loyalty.6   This loyalty was highly coveted 
to limit the effects of market competition.  These burgeoning conferences are 
occasionally referred to as cartels.  These cartels are not always viewed favorably or as 
proper. 
Conferences continued to have a free hand in spite of the occasional use of 
practices widely recognized as undesirable, such as the use of “fighting ships.”  
Fighting ships were placed on berth by conference members collectively to 
coincide with the schedule of an “outsider”.  Rates would be cut to ensure 
retention of traffic to the conference. 6 
It should be noted that modern “conferences” today have followed predictable business 
trends in relation to government in that it is a heavily regulated industry, thus limiting 
misuse of power.   
 
In order to recognize the influence the European Union wields within the maritime 
industry, the following data is helpful. 
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The EU enjoys current world dominance in the industry. Currently, ninety 
percent of all external trade with Europe and 40 percent of all internal trade is 
transported by sea. Although not all members of the EU have large maritime 
industries, all countries experience direct and indirect impact from waterborne 
transportation. 4 
Such considerable market control lends itself to having the ability to be a trend setter 
within the industry.  This leadership position can also lead to forefront attention which 
spurs the industry into the need to regulate further. 
 
Changes in regulation 
As of October 25, 2008, the European Union lifted the block exemption allowing 
“conferences” and closing the door on anti-competitive behavior on the part of shipping 
firms doing business in and out of the European Union.3  The “lift” did not actually 
introduce new laws, but is simply enforcing old laws already on the books.  The 
parameters that initially existed in order to create a block exception were deemed 
obsolete.7   
 
Purpose of change in regulation 
Behind change is typically some force, internal or external, that changes the variables.  
When faced with variable change, reactions to the change typically will be for the 
betterment of the firm.  Let us examine some of those benefits of the change in the 
lifting of the block exemption. 
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One of the potential benefits from this change within the industry is the lower prices.8  It 
was noted earlier that a side effect of lifting the exemption is increased competition.  
Typically, as competition for market shares grows, the customers benefit from decreased 
costs as firms compete for their business, as is evidenced in other markets.9 
The introduction of competition for both international telephone calls and 
European economy airfares caused average prices to fall by more than half 
within the decade as national monopolies or dominant firms became subject to 
greater competition. Within the new car and replica football kits markets, where 
competition from close substitutes was more prevalent, price reductions of more 
than 10% have been observed. 10 
 
Effects of change in regulation 
Because of regulation changes, firms that enjoyed stable revenue will face increased 
volatility within the market.  Small firms that are more susceptible to market shifts are 
likely to feel the instability the most.9  Small firms may find it harder to adjust rapidly to 
the block exemption removal and may be at a disadvantage compared to larger firms.  
The UK has looked at the “policy implications [and they] have already been 
considered”.8   
A Partial Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) carried out by the Department of 
Trade and Industry in January 2006 on this subject was considered by both 
Houses and cleared by their respective Committees. 8 
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It was determined that there “is no justification for retention of the block exemption on 
competition grounds and therefore the regulation should be repealed in its entirety.8 The 
UK believes that repeal of the block exemption “offers clear benefits to the consumer in 
terms of lowering transport costs, maintaining reliability of services and enhancing the 
industry’s competitiveness in a global market”.8  Further the report says “that a repeal of 
the block exemption will bring about substantial benefits to EU industry and consumers, 
in particular as regards transport prices, reliability of liner shipping services, 
competitiveness of the EU liner shipping industry and small EU liner carriers.8  
 
This change could have several impacts on the European Union maritime industry firms.  
The first is decreased volatility of freight rates on liner routes.  The second is the 
potential increase in merger activity and thus shrinkage of available market shares.  This 
consolidation leads to fewer firms competing within a market should new competition 
not enter the market. 
 
The specific benefits which were determined from the impact study were many.  One is 
that the transport prices for liner shipping services would decline.7  It was also found that 
service reliability in regards to deep sea and short sea trades would improve.7  The 
service quality and competitiveness of EU liner shipping firms were both believed to 
either be impacted positively or be unaffected by the change of regulation.8 Perhaps the 
most counter intuitive findings, were that small liner shipping carriers would not 
experience problems and that no negative impact or even positive impact would occur 
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for EU ports, employment, trade, and/or developing countries.8  This summation of why 
the block exemption should be repealed mirrors many views within the EU maritime 
industry, as shown in interviews with industry leaders.4 
 
Freight rate theory 
One of the driving reasons for allowing a block exemption allowing liner conferences 
was a side effect of anti-competitive behavior: freight rate stability.8  As a whole, freight 
rates are a volatile thing, as can be seen in Figure 2 of freight rates for 2007 from the 
Baltic Exchange, where a decrease in rates occurred after the October change in 
regulation.11  This characteristic has drawn the attention of financial traders, who thrive 
on volatile markets.12  This does not benefit shippers which are exposed to shifting 
rates.13   
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Figure 2. Baltic Exchange Dry Index (BDI) Rates 
 
The argument for the block exemption creating this calming affect on the freight rate 
markets often stems from conference members themselves.14  The carriers feel 
conferences improve services by avoiding destructive competition, overcapacity, and 
helping to stabilize rates.14 
 
Unfortunately data from the 1980’s, during the initial block exemption, is scarce.  Many 
of the firms involved with conferences were privately held.15  Hence, very little public 
data is available as to the actual effects of the block exemption on liner freight rates from 
this period.   
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Data collected from the United Nation’s annual publication called Review of Maritime 
Transport, provides an interesting insight into liner freight rate behavior.16  
 
 
 
 
                            
  
  Table 1. Monthly Liner  Freight Rate Averages
 
 
        
  
Months 1985 1986 1987 
  
        
  
January 168 144 121 
  
  
February 172 139 121 
  
  
March 171 135 123 
  
  
April 161 136 123 
  
  
May 164 135 123 
  
  
June 163 134 124 
  
  
July 156 131 124 
  
  
August 153 128 124 
  
  
September 155 128 123 
  
  
October 150 127 121 
  
  
November 148 127 116 
  
  
December 146 126 115 
  
  
        
  
  
Source:  Review of Maritime Transport 
1987 
  
        
        As can be seen from Table 1, the freight rates in the year following the block exemption 
have more monthly averages that match other months, thus showing lower volatility.  
Also, it can be seen on Table 1 that the rates lowered after the regulation change.  Even 
further, the range of the rates from 1986 to 1987 reduced from 18 to 9, which is a 
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reduction in range by 50 percent.  Further review of this data revealed the percentage 
changes from month to month throughout each year, as can be seen in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Monthly Liner Freight Rate Change Percentage 
 
Month to Month 1985   1986   1987 
 
        
 
January to February       
 
%Change 2.38%  3.47%  0.00%  
 
February to March       
 
%Change 0.58%  2.88%  1.65%  
 
March to April       
 
%Change 5.85%  0.74%  0.00%  
 
April to May       
 
%Change 1.86%  0.74%  0.00%  
 
May to June       
 
%Change 0.61%  0.74%  0.81%  
 
June to July       
 
%Change 4.29%  2.24%  0.00%  
 
July to August       
 
%Change 1.92%  2.29%  0.00%  
 
August to September       
 
%Change 1.31%  0.00%  0.81%  
 
September to October       
 
%Change 3.23%  0.78%  1.63%  
 
October to November       
 
%Change 1.33%  0.00%  4.13%  
 
November to December       
 
%Change 1.35% 
 
0.79% 
 
0.86% 
 
 
            
 
 
Created using data obtained from: Review of Maritime Transport 
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Mergers 
Whether the industry will utilize the business tool of Joint Ventures has yet to be 
determined.  In order to determine whether mergers or joint ventures should be used is 
based off current European Union guidelines.  Utilizing a self assessment methods, firms 
self test from within. These self assessments will help firms determine whether they are 
in compliance with current EU competition regulations.   
 
The following self assessment 7 step tool kit is used to determine the risk of breaking 
competition laws under the new conference regulation17: 
1 Examine the structure of the market 
2 Consider the nature of the information being exchanged 
3 Who are the participants in the information exchange? 
4 Consider the age of the information being exchanged, but in the context of the 
market involved? 
5 How frequent are the information exchanges? 
6 In what manner was the information exchanged? 
7 What about the exchange of price indexes? 
  
 
The consequences of breach of the competition rules can be severe, based on the 
examples of fines imposed by the European Commission to companies totaling 
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272,980,000 Pounds.18  In regards to companies conforming to regulations, 
consequences such as fines, aid in the norming process.19 
 
Once it has been determined that a pool needs to be adjusted in order to avoid these 
possible consequences, there are several possible moves.  The pool can dissolve, it can 
do nothing and hope for the best, defend itself, “de-claw” its activities to conform, or 
restructure.17 
 
Restructuring as a compliance option also has multiple methods.  The pool partners can 
merge into one or the partners can create a full functioning joint venture.17  Once this is 
done the merger must go through a notification and clearance process, meet the full 
compliance guarantee.17 
 
According to the European Commission, mergers could generate efficiency gains such 
as economies of scale and enhanced technical progress or might improve the efficiency 
of management.  Another possible outcome could be anti-competitive effects due to the 
unilateral increase of market power or increased collusion opportunities from a reduction 
of market competitors.20 
 
There are three distinct reasons for utilizing mergers and acquisitions to gain market 
share control.  The first is that acquisitions of firms are quick to be executed.9  By 
utilizing mergers to gain greater market share, firms can quickly build itself into the 
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market.9  The second advantage of utilizing mergers is to gain a specific advantage over 
competitors, whom might also be vying for market share.9  Market can see surges in 
mergers and acquisitions to gain control of markets.  This can be caused by deregulation 
or regulation changes which create variable change in firm’s decision paradigms 
regarding market approach.9  The third benefit to mergers and acquisitions is the belief 
that there is less risk involved with merger and acquisitions.9  This is in part due to the 
fact that a firm is acquiring assets, know-how, and market specific knowledge.9  The 
acquired firm has a history of revenue and expenses which can aid in evaluating risk and 
benefit.9 
 
Added to the four conditions set by Williamson under transactional cost economic 
theory, “a fifth condition, of no regulatory prohibition on cooperative organizational 
structures, leads not only to removing the transaction from the market into an 
organizational form, but the transaction migrates into a specific type of organizational 
form, which is in this case is the cooperative strategy or pool”.4  Using this theory, the 
reverse of which would equate to firms moving from conferences into a structure that 
eliminates uncertainty.  Through the activity of mergers, companies would therefore 
bypass market regulations that create uncertainty. 
 
Based on data retrieved from the industry journal “TradeWinds” and the Lloyd’s 
shipping Competition Seminar Documents, the liner shipping industry is beginning to 
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take advantage of alternatives to conferences is clear, following a series of merger 
activity over recent times.21   
 
 
        
 Year   Purchasing Firm   Target Firm    
        
 2005  AP Moller Maersk  P&O Nedlloyd   
        
 2005  TUI (Hapag-Lloyd)  CP Ships   
        
 2007  Torm & teekay  OMI   
        
             
 Figure 3. Major Liner Service Related Company Mergers & Acquisitions  
         
The European Commission (EC) has approved the acquisition of P&O Nedlloyd by AP 
Moller Maersk in July of 2005.  The EC also approved the acquisition of CP Ships by 
TUI which controls Hapag Lloyd in October of 2005.  In more recent times, Torm and 
Teekay successfully jointly purchased OMI in 2007, all of which can be seen in Figure 3.  
Lowri Evans, formerly the director of DG Competition, commented that, “the 
consolidation process is a positive development for the EU industry.”22   Evans also 
noted,” the European Commission’s reform of competition law in the international 
maritime sector may encourage further consolidation.” 22 
 
Even if consolidation within the industry continues in 2009, the European Commission 
states the following: 
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Even if the repeal of Regulation 4056/86 would lead to an increase in merger 
activities, it is unlikely that this would result in a significant increase in 
concentration on a global scale. 23 
 
For many pool members, the idea of merging firms might not be viable because they 
reduce flexibility and independence.9   Should this be the case, joint ventures may be an 
acceptable alternative.  Theoretically, changing a pool into a joint venture operationally 
or structurally will not lead to much change.17   
 
Consortia agreements are already available to the liner service industry under the 
Consortia block exemption, Regulation 823/2000.  How long this will be available with 
the current trends in regulation change should be of concern to firm managers when 
decided to utilize consortia as a form of cooperation.17  Consortia generally help to 
improve the productivity and quality of available liner services due to the economies of 
scale achieved.17   
 
Methods 
The first method of data analysis involves the testing that will be done in regards to the 
liner freight rate volatility.  Data was obtained from the United Nations annual 
publication called the Review of Maritime Transport.16  This liner index was compiled 
by the Ministry of Transport of the Federal Republic of Germany.  Specifically, the 
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monthly weighted assessments of freight rates on cargoes loaded or discharged by liners 
of all flags at ports in the Antwerp/Hamburg range.   
 
The monthly liner freight rates for individual years were collected: 1985, 1986, and 
1987.  Using this data, the percentage change from one month to the next was 
determined.  The highest monthly average was then compared to the lowest monthly rate 
average in order to determine the range.  
 
Based on the argument that the regulation change had an effect on merger activity, the 
second method chosen for this paper involves the analysis of reported merger activity 
information.  I will be utilizing data obtained from the industry journal, TradeWinds.  I 
will be utilizing data collected from 2007 and 2008 in anticipation of the regulation 
change.  By collecting and transforming data into a numerical format, trends and patterns 
can be used to glean conclusions about mergers.  The purpose of this analysis is to 
determine any trends in the mergers and if there is any correlation between regulation 
changes and merger activities.    
 
I am choosing my data sample based on several factors.  The first involves location.  I 
will be analyzing only mergers that are subject to a member country of the European 
Union.  Second, the data I will be using must be readily available.  Thus, I am only using 
data that is published by the TradeWinds.  I will analyze the 2007-2008 data that is 
available in order to determine any increase or decrease in merger talks.  I will only 
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analyze merger activity based on liner routes that are relative to the EU regulation 
change.  Thus, I will be utilizing specific company related mergers that operate within 
the realms of “liner shipping”. 
 
The collected merger data is from the specific years: 2007-2009.  I will analyze the 2007 
year merger activity versus the 2008 merger activity preceding the regulation change in 
October of 2008, in order to obtain trends relating to the regulation change.  Further 
analysis should be conducted of the current regulation change which occurred in October 
of 2008 by expanding the data collected further from the actual change in regulation. 
 
The specific statistical test used to analyze the data is the Paired T-test, utilizing 
Microsoft Excel, based on a 1-tailed distribution.  My sample arrays came from Table 3 
data.  The first sample is based on data collected from 2007, before the block exemption 
was lifted.  The second sample of data comes from 2008 collected data, also regarding 
the time period before the change in regulation.   
 
This was chosen in order to analyze the merger activity before the block exemption was 
lifted and any activity that was done in expectation of the regulation change.  Therefore 
the first sample set will consist of 2007 monthly totals.  The second sample set will 
consist of monthly data collected from 2008.   
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Table 3.   Monthly EU Related Merger Activity 
 
      
 
Month 2007 2008 2009 
 
      
 
January 0 1 0 
 
 
February 0 3 0 
 
 
March 0 2 3 
 
 
April 1 1 0 
 
 
May 0 1 n/a 
 
 
June 0 1 n/a 
 
 
July 0 0 n/a 
 
 
August 0 4 n/a 
 
 
September 0 1 n/a 
 
 
October 1 0 n/a 
 
 
November 0 0 n/a 
 
 
December 0 0 n/a 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
The results for the first hypothesis tests show a reduction in freight rate volatility in 
regards to the liner shipping freight rates as can be seen in Table 4.  The liner freight rate 
data shows that the percentage change averages from one month to the next for the year 
1987 was less than 1985 percent change average.   In fact, each consecutive year from 
1985 to 1987 shows a downward trend in volatility of liner freight rates.   
 
 
Table 4. Yearly Average Liner Freight Rate Monthly Percentage Change 
 
        
 
Month to Month 1985   1986   1987 
 
  
     
 
 
Average of Monthly 
Percentage Rate 
Change  
2.25%  1.33%  0.90% 
 
 
            
 
 
Chart derived from data collected from Review of Maritime Transport 1987 
 
         
This downward trend in volatility of liner freight rates seems to confirm the EU’s 
argument that liner conferences would help decrease the volatility within the liner 
market.   
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The merger data results showed an increase in total merger activities in 2008 compared 
to 2007 as can be seen in Table 5.  This data backs up the theory that the affect of the 
change in regulation was an increase in mergers activity.   
 
      
   Table 5. TradeWinds Merger Data 2007-2009      
 Data 
April - December 
2007 
January - December 
2008 
January- April 
2009  
      
 
EU Related Merger 
Totals 2 14 3  
          
 Source of data: TradeWinds     
 
 
The T- test revealed that the differences in the 2007 merger activity mean and the 2008 
merger activity mean were statistically significant, as can be seen in Table 6. Thus, 
proving the increased merger activity hypothesis. 
 
 
    Table 6. T-test Results     
      
 
Month  Array 1  Array2 
 
January  0  1 
 
February  0  3 
 
March  0  2 
 
April  1  1 
 
May  0  1 
 
June  0  1 
 
July  0  0 
 
August  0  4 
 
September  0  1 
 
October  1  0 
 
November  0  0 
 
December  0  0 
      
  
T-Test : 0.0161375  
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Limitations 
Limitations of this research involve the availability of information.  The liner freight rate 
data is not a complete picture of all liner freight rates for the specified years due to the 
lack of complete merger news coverage.  The merger activity data collected from the 
industry journal TradeWinds also offers problems with data in that while it is packed 
with industry information, it does not record all mergers and acquisitions activity for the 
industry.  Therefore a complete picture of merger activity cannot be determined.  
Furthermore, the effects of a world recession and decreased flow of credit have not been 
measured as to the effects on merger activity. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on the results of the examination of freight rate data, it can be concluded that the 
European Union’s block exemption did have an effect on the volatility of liner freight 
rates on routes operating in and out of EU member nations.  There is a reduction of 
freight rate volatility after the change in regulation, thus achieving the desired goal of 
normalizing liner freight rates. 
 
Merger activity data indicates an increase in merger activity from 2007 to 2008 and was 
statistically proven via a T-test.  Thus, the base theory that the regulation change would 
affect the industry by increasing competition and creating an environment where 
companies would combine or merge in order to remain competitive, is validated.   
 
The long reaching implications of this research are difficult to determine.  As with most 
business, the maritime industry is constantly evolving whether this is due to internal 
changes such as management turnover or external influences such as government 
regulations.  I believe that having a better understanding of how firms react to regulation 
will better prepare firms and mangers in making “real time” decisions in the best interest 
of the company.  This is supported in other markets that deal with environmental issues 
in that “those companies that stay ahead of and go beyond the requirements of federal, 
state and local environmental regulations often can also establish a competitive market 
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advantage.24  It is better to act as opposed to react to changing variables within the 
industry. 
 
The next consideration in using this research is the potential for consolidation within the 
industry.  A worldwide economic down turn combined with governmental regulation 
changes may lead to increased competition.  This should lower profit margins and 
decrease revenue stability.  Smaller market share holders may face issues of being 
acquired by larger competitors within the market place.  Firms should prepare for 
possible approaches from smaller firms seeking consolidation or larger firms taking 
advantage of the unfavorable economic situation by acquiring smaller firms to sustain 
growth and provide stability.  The data obtained from TradeWinds confirms this increase 
in merger activity in 2008.  The trends for 2009 have yet to be determined. 
 
To expand on the financial impact, we look towards the study done to forecast market 
effect of the repeal of the conference block exemption.  The estimated fiscal effect in 
annual benefit is around £17 to 85 million.8  It should be of note that those responsible 
for estimating these numbers are cautious of the accuracy. 
Benefits cannot be accurately measured; however, even a small range of price 
declines would lead to annual savings of many millions of pounds. Smaller 
customers with weaker buyer power are likely to benefit most.8 
When judging the affects of this change in regulation on overall firm strategy, certain 
logical facts exist.  Economic recessions, by definition, are not a sign of growth, but 
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shrinkage.  If a firm cannot grow via overall market growth, then it is a logical option to 
attempt to increase market share size through acquisition of competition.  Decreased 
profit margins and depressed market value can all lead less fiscally strong firms to 
become targets for firms who are flush with cash. 
Removal of the block exemption may lead to further mergers between carriers 
and higher market concentration. This may lead to a more oligopoly / monopoly 
market structure. However, the liner shipping market is already characterized by 
high market concentration and a trend towards greater concentration.8  
Firms should prepare for such situations, but on occasion, they do not adjust to the new 
variable changes occurring around them.  In the end, firms that have a smaller market 
share may find it harder to adjust rapidly to the block exemption removal and may be at 
a disadvantage compared to larger firms. 
 
One of the driving theories in favor of pooling is the calming effects they have on the 
liner freight rate market.  Rates tend to fluctuate when competition is high.8  This drives 
owners to lowering prices to sway customers to use their vessels.  The unfortunate side 
effect of this is that the lowering of prices means less profit.  Less profit means less 
money to re-invest into the vessels and crew.  This may lead to un-kept vessels which 
are a danger to crew and society at large.25   Also, such competition might lead to 
instability in the flow of goods.  The point of having liner routes is that goods move 
from point to point on a regular schedule which can be planed around by customers.1  
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Open competition for routes could lead to vessels moving from route to route based on 
profitability causing a flux in supply and therefore demand of products onboard vessels. 
 
An economic downturn, which potentially can also drive down freight rates, combined 
with increased competition within the EU shipping industry will cause firms to cut 
costs.9  This might cause them to lay up vessels which under normal circumstances 
would be operated at a profit despite inefficiencies.  The strategies of leading maritime 
shipping companies remain shrouded for the moment, but I believe that the use of 
alliances, pools, and consortia will continue to be used in varying degrees and methods.  
Warnings of more severe world-wide effects can be heeded as shown in the next article: 
 If the U.S. government revoked conferences' antitrust immunity, conferences 
 would lose their collective rate-making capability.  This could create the 
 potential loss of the majority of their membership. In such a case, rate wars might 
 ensue much like what has happened in U.S. domestic airline and trucking 
 industries. Unrestrained competition in these industries has led to widespread 
 carrier failure and a multitude of mergers and acquisitions. It is also possible that 
 deregulated ocean shipping industry without liner conferences serving the U.S. 
 would weaken remaining U.S.-flag carriers like Sea-Land and American 
 President Line.6  
There will also be some positive effects from this change in regulation. In the long term, 
increased competition puts further pressure on carriers to innovate and improve 
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performance.8   With this in mind, technologies, service, and overall performance should 
improve efficiency as firms compete for market shares. 
 
Future research 
Further research could be done in the realm of liner freight rate trends.  The collection of 
data from other years would generate a more complete picture of liner freight rate 
behavior.  The affects of a world recession and decreased credit flow on mergers and 
acquisitions should be investigated within the maritime industry. 
 
Conclusions 
Overall discussions with industry and regulation makers have left the distinct mark of a 
very chaotic time within the liner shipping industry.  As paths are determined for the 
proper course to follow, firms will have to react accordingly.  At this time the industry 
conditions can be summed in this quote from Dr. William McMullen, PhD and Head of 
the Maritime Administration department of Texas A&M at Galveston, “the maritime 
industry is constantly shifting in order to adjust to new variables.  With the new 
regulation changes still so new, the industry must remain fluid to change.”5   
 
 
 
 
29 
 
REFERENCES AND NOTES 
 
1. Packard, W., 1995. Shipping Pools. Second. (London: Lloyd's of London Press 
Ltd). 
 
2. Packard, W., 1989. Shipping Pools.  (London: Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd). 
 
3. Pekkarinen, M., 2006. Official Journal of the European Union. <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do>  
 
4. McMullen, W. and Mileski, J., 2007. Changing European Union Regulation of 
the Maritime Industry. 
 
5. McMullen, W., 2009. Private Communication. 
 
6. Heaver, T., 2001. The Shipping Conferences Exemption Act: Review and 
Suggestions of Positions Appropriate for the Panel. <http://www.reviewcta-
examenltc.gc.ca/CTAReview/CTAReview/english/reports/heaver_scea.pdf>  
 
7. Sigmund, A., 2006.  President of the European Economic and Social Committee.  
Official Journal of the European Union. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do>  
 
8. Department of Transport., 2008. Explanatory Memorandum to the Merchant 
Shipping (Liner Conference) Act 1982 (Repeal) 2008. 163rd ed.  
 
9. Hill, C., 2008. International Business. Competing in the Global Marketplace. 
(Syracuse, New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin).  
 
10. Coles, H., Davies, S., Olczak, M., Pike, C., and Wilson, C., 2004. DTI 
Economics Paper 9, The Benefits from Competition: Some Illustrative UK 
Cases, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia. 
 
11. Baltic Exchange., Baltic Dry Index Data. 2007-2009. 
<http://www.balticexchange.com/> 
 
12. Bradbury, M., 2009. The Modern Tanker Office: Operations and Freight 
Derivatives. Texas A&M Guest Speaker Series.  
 
13. Latrobe, J., 2009. The Modern Tanker Office: Operations and Freight 
Derivatives. Texas A&M Guest Speaker Series.  
 
30 
 
14. Clarke, R., 1997. An Analysis of the International Ocean Shipping Conference 
System.  Transportation Journal.  36, 17.   
 
15. Bourne, C., 2009.  Executive Director.  European Liner Affairs Association.  
(Lloyd’s Maritime Academy: EU Competition Law in Shipping).   
 
16. Review of Maritime Transport., 1985,1986,1987. United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. Geneva. 
 
17. Tupper, S., 2009.  Merger Regulations – Possibilities and Pitfalls.  (Lloyd’s 
Maritime Academy: EU Competition Law in Shipping)   
 
18. Holmes, M.,  2009. Consortia Legislation.  (Lloyd’s Maritime Academy: EU 
Competition Law in Shipping).  
 
19. DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W.W., 1983. The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American 
Sociological Review. 48,147-160. 
 
20. Power, V., 2009. Head of EU & Competition Group, A&L Goodbody.  The EU 
Law on Sharing Information between Competitors.  (Lloyd’s Maritime Academy: 
EU Competition Law in Shipping).   
 
21. TradeWinds, 2007, 2008, 2009. Merger Data. <http://www.tradewinds.no/>. 
22. Evans, L., 2008. The EU’s New Competition Regime for Maritime Transport: 
Options and Opportunities for the Shipping Industry. 4th Edition. 
<http://www.wfw.com>.  
 
23. ELAA, 2005. European Commission Review of Council Regulation 4056/86. 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/others/elaa_resp.pdf>  
 
24. Challener, C., 2007. Keeping Current with Regulations. ChemAlliance.Org. 
<http://www.chemalliance.org/Articles/040927.asp>.    
 
25. Haralambides, H.E., Tsolakis, S.D. and Cridland, C., 2005. Econometric 
modeling of new building and secondhand ship prices, in: Cullinane, K.P.B. 
(ed.), Shipping Economics, Research in Transportation Economics, Vol. XII, 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier). 
 
 
31 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Copyright Information 
Operations Mailbox <operations@balticexchange.com>  Mon, Apr 27, 2009 at 5:11 AM  
To: S H <samuelr.henderson@gmail.com>  
Thank you for your enquiry. 
We grant you permission to publish a chart of the BDI in your thesis on a one off 
basis. 
Please note that any use of the data must be credited with Baltic Exchange 
Information Services Ltd, and correctly headed.  
The BDI should be referred to as Baltic Exchange Dry Index. 
  
Please see articles regarding republication of Baltic data 
  
1. http://www.balticexchange.com/default.asp?action=article&ID=24 
2. http://www.balticexchange.com/default.asp?action=article&ID=878 
3. http://www.balticexchange.com/default.asp?action=article&ID=4831 
  
Please forward an electronic copy of the chart when complete for our own records. 
Regards 
Operations 
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